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Abstract—We propose a simple yet efficient scheme for a set
of energy-harvesting sensors to establish secure communication
with a common destination (a master node). An eavesdropper
attempts to decode the data sent from the sensors to their
common destination. We assume a single modulation scheme that
can be implemented efficiently for energy-limited applications.
We design a multiple-access scheme for the sensors under
secrecy and limited-energy constraints. In a given time slot, each
energy-harvesting sensor chooses between sending its packet or
remaining idle. The destination assigns a set of data time slots to
each sensor. The optimization problem is formulated to maximize
the secrecy sum-throughput.
Index Terms—Energy harvesting, fading channels, eavesdrop-
per, secrecy sum-throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
The energy harvesting capability enables battery charging
by ambient energy sources instead of frequent battery re-
placements. An energy-harvesting sensor (EHS) is a promising
solution for maintenance-free wireless sensor networks. It
relies only on the energy harvested from ambient energy
sources such as solar, vibration, thermal, and radio frequency
[1] for its operation. The design of an EHS presents new chal-
lenges compared to a battery-based sensor because the energy
availability from the environment is likely to be sporadic and
random [1], [2].
The authors of [3] and [4] consider both the energy har-
vesting profile and the channel statistics in scheduling EHS
transmissions. Both works focus on energy allocation for EHS
transmissions assuming that the energy level and channel state
change randomly from one slot to another. The proposed
approaches in [3] and [4] allow the EHS to transmit at variable
data rates depending on the battery energy level and channel
state. We assume a single modulation scheme [2], which
is a typical restriction in communication standards designed
for energy-efficient applications [2]. This allows the EHS
hardware to be highly optimized from an energy consumption
perspective. Using adaptive modulation schemes as in [3]–[5]
would improve the average achieved EHS data rate but at the
cost of increased implementation complexity.
Security issues in wireless communication networks have
received significant attention recently [6]. Unlike [2]–[5],
we consider secure communication among energy-constrained
sensors and design multiple-access schemes to manage the
access of the different network’s sensors. In addition, we take
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into account the impact of interference from other sensor nodes
that use the same unlicensed frequency band.
In this letter, we assume a set of sensors that communicate
with a common destination in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per. Time and channel access are slotted. The eavesdropper
attempts to decode the sensors’ messages in each time slot.
Our contributions in this letter are as follows: a) Unlike [3]–
[5], we consider the multi-sensor scenario and take the security
issue into consideration in addition to the processing energy
consumed at the EHS and the interference at each sensor due
to other sensors which use the same unlicensed frequency
band; b) we propose an information-theoretic formulation of
the problem of secure communication between the sensors
and the destination; c) we propose a new multiple-access
scheme for fixed-rate systems where sensor nodes only send
packetized data using a single modulation scheme, which is
common for energy-constrained applications [2]. Our proposed
scheme allocates sensors to data time slots based on security
considerations as well as battery energy levels during each
frame; d) we derive the maximum secure sum-throughput of
the sensor network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a network composed of M sensors commu-
nicating with a single destination. The sensor transmissions
use the unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical (ISM)
frequency bands. Each frame is divided into three time inter-
vals: (1) a time interval for channel estimation and information
exchange between the sensors and the destination; (2) a time
interval for transmitting the beacon signal which contains the
assignment (allocation) of data time slots to sensors during
the frame from the destination to the sensors; and (3) a time
interval for the data time slots. The destination sends a beacon
that indicates the beginning of the data time slots and shows
the distribution of time slots among sensors. It is assumed that
the activities during communication between the sensors and
destination deplete a certain amount of energy, denoted by E˜τ
energy units for frame τ . We assume that if the communication
for a sensor is not secured, the destination will not assign any
time slots for that sensor. Each frame lasts for Tf seconds. The
length of the data time slots is T < Tf slots each of length one
second. We refer to the sensors as the legitimate sources. Each
sensor communicates with the legitimate destination (master
node) in the presence of an eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1.
The sources are rechargeable and capable of harvesting
energy from the ambient energy sources. The energy harvested
by a sensor is stored (buffered) in a rechargeable battery
(energy queue). At times t = 1, 2, . . . , T, the kth sensor
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Fig. 1. Network model with one sensor, the eavesdropper and the destination.
Ej denotes the energy harvested by the sensor in time slot j.
collects energy with amounts Ekτ,1, Ekτ,2, . . . , Ekτ,T [5]. That is,
the cumulative energy harvested at Sensor k from the ambient
energy sources in time slot j of frame τ is Ekτ,j energy units
(see Fig. 2). The sources are saturated, i.e., always backlogged
with data packets. In addition, data and energy buffers are
assumed to be unlimited in size [5].
Unlike [3] and [5], we assume that energy is consumed due
to data transmissions as well as any other energy costs such
as processing, measurements, sensing, circuitry, etc, whose
cumulative energy is assumed to be Ekp energy units per data
time slot. Moreover, we assume that the energy amounts are
known a priori which is justified if the environment is highly
predictable, e.g., the energy is harvested from a solar panel or
from the vibration of motors that are turned on only during
fixed operating hours [5]. To conserve the sensor energy, the
sensor is ON in a given time slot only when it is assigned to
that slot.
We assume that each sensor is assigned a set of time
slots within each frame. That is, during frame τ , Sensor k is
assigned ωkτ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T } slots.1 If Sensor k is allocated
to time slot j during frame τ , ωkτ,j = 1; otherwise, ωkτ,j = 0.
We adopt a block-fading channel model and consider the
effect of interference from other sensors that use the same
frequency band. In a given time slot, the source knows the
channel state information (CSI) of the link connecting itself to
its destination, and the link connecting it and the eavesdropper;
this assumption is common in the literature, e.g., [7], [8].2
Given the availability of CSI at the source in each time
slot, the source determines the amount of transmit power
needed to mitigate channel outages while maintaining the data
undecodable at the eavesdropper (i.e. while maintaining secure
communication with the legitimate receiver). In each time slot,
the EHS decides whether to transmit its data or remain silent.
Remaining silent in a time slot is beneficial for the following
reasons: (1) to harvest more energy if the available energy
amount does not ensure successful and secure communication,
(2) to wait until the channel gains improve over their current
levels so that the required power for establishing successful
and secure communication becomes lower. We assume that
the fading gain3 of a link remains constant during a frame
duration, and changes identically and independently from one
1These values are chosen prior to the frame and are sent to the sensors
using the beacon signal.
2As argued in [8], the CSI is usually estimated through pilots and feedback
from the destinations as in [9]. CSI estimation without using pilots and
feedback may also be implemented as proposed in [10].
3We refer to the squared absolute value of the complex channel fading
coefficient as the fading or channel gain.
frame to another. Note that channels are assumed to be fixed
over the whole frame which is reasonable for fixed sensor
networks since the coherence time is typically much longer
than the frame time.
Assuming additive Gaussian noise and interference, for a
given channel realization of the legitimate link, the capacity
of the link between the kth legitimate EHS and the legitimate
destination in time slot j of frame τ is given by
CkL = log2
(
1 +
P kτ α
k
τ
Nd
)
[bits/sec/Hz] (1)
where Nd is the noise-plus-interference power at the destina-
tion in Watts, P kτ is the transmit power (or energy)4 in Watts
(joules) of Sensor k at time slot j, and αkτ is the squared
magnitude of the complex channel fading coefficient between
the kth sensor and its destination in frame τ .
Similarly, the capacity of the link between the kth EHS and
the eavesdropper for a given channel realization βkτ is
CkE = log2
(
1 +
P kτ β
k
τ
Ne
)
[bits/sec/Hz] (2)
where βkτ is the squared magnitude of the complex channel
fading coefficient between the kth sensor and the eavesdropper
in frame τ , and Ne is the noise-plus-interference power at the
eavesdropper’s receiver in Watts. The secrecy capacity for a
given channel fading realization is given by [6]
CkS =
{
CkL − C
k
E α
k
τ/Nd > β
k
τ /Ne
0 αkτ/Nd ≤ β
k
τ /Ne
, (3)
Let R = B/Ts/W bits/sec/Hz, where Ts = 1 is the slot du-
ration, B is the packet size, and W is the channel bandwidth.
As long as the EHS transmits with a rate R that does not
exceed the secrecy capacity, i.e., R < CkS , its transmission is
secure and successfully decodable at its legitimate destination.
Using (3) when αkτ/Nd > βkτ /Ne, and the secrecy condition
R < CkS , we get the following relation
R < CkL − C
k
E = log2
(
1 +
P kτ α
k
τ
Nd
)
− log2
(
1 +
P kτ β
k
τ
Ne
)
(4)
Letting α˜kτ =
αkτ
Nd
and β˜kτ =
βkτ
Ne
and after straightforward
algebra, we get
P kτ ≥
2R − 1
α˜kτ − 2
Rβ˜kτ
[Watts] (5)
with α˜kτ − 2Rβ˜kτ > 0. Note that the condition α˜kτ − 2Rβ˜kτ > 0
subsumes α˜kτ > β˜kτ . That is, α˜kτ > 2Rβ˜kτ > β˜kτ . If α˜kτ −
2Rβ˜kτ ≤ 0, this implies that the rate exceeds the capacity CkS ;
hence, the transmission is not secure. The right-hand side of
(5) represents the minimum EHS transmit power needed to
ensure that its legitimate link is not in outage (i.e. its data is
decodable at the legitimate destination) and to ensure secure
communication with the legitimate destination.
One may attempt to optimize the EHS transmit power to
satisfy the constraints and to maximize the secrecy throughput.
4Transmit power and energy are equal in our case as the slot duration is
one second, i.e., Ts = 1 seconds as mentioned earlier.
3However, due to the fact that the EHS adopts a fixed-rate data
transmission scheme, the optimal power is the minimum power
that results in successful and secure decoding of the data at
the destination. This is because the source (sensor) is power-
constrained and must optimally manage its energy usage. From
(5), it is clear that the minimum transmit energy by Sensor k
in time slot j of frame τ , denoted by Pkτ , which is required
to ensure that the link between the legitimate source and its
destination is secure and not in outage, is Pkτ = 2
R
−1
α˜kτ−2
Rβ˜kτ
when α˜kτ > 2Rβ˜kτ . Hence, one should use this value to achieve
the highest throughput as time progresses.
We define a new variable γkτ,j ∈ {0, 1} which indicates the
use of power Pkτ or zero power if the source decides to remain
idle during the jth slot. In particular, if the source uses power
Pkτ , γ
k
τ,j = 1; otherwise γkτ,j = 0.
We denote the energy harvested by Sensor k at the end of
the frame (i.e. beginning of the communication and beacon
sessions) as Ek◦,τ . Let Ekτ,j denote the energy harvested by
the kth sensor from the ambient sources in time slot j
during the τ th frame, and okτ,j = γkτ,jPkτ + γkτ,jEkp denote
the energy depleted from battery of Sensor k in time slot j
due to data transmission and other activities, e.g., processing,
measurements, etc. Note that Ekτ,1 can be viewed as the energy
harvested at the end of the beacon signal transmission. We
assume that at the beginning of frame τ , the battery maintains
Bkτ−1 energy units which is the remaining energy from the
previous frame. Note that Bk0 represents the initial battery
energy level of Sensor k, i.e., first usage of the battery. In
addition, if Bkτ−1 + Ek◦,τ = 0 or Bkτ−1 +Ek◦,τ < E˜kτ , the
sensor will not be able to communicate with the destination
(or overhear the beacon) and it remains idle to save its energy;
hence, the destination assigns no data slots to that sensor.
The energy stored in the EHS’s energy queue at the begin-
ning of the jth time slot during the τ th frame, denoted by
Qkτ,j , is given by
Qkτ,1 = B
k
τ−1 + E
k
◦,τ − δ
k
τ E˜τ + E
k
τ,1, j = 1
Qkτ,j = Q
k
τ,j−1 − o
k
τ,j−1 + E
k
τ,j , ∀j ≥ 2
(6)
where Ek◦,τ is the energy harvested at the beginning of the
frame, E˜τ is the energy depleted at the beginning of frame
τ for information exchange and beacon decoding, δkτ = 1 if
Bkτ−1+E
k
◦,τ ≥ E˜
k
τ and zero otherwise, okτ,j−1 represents the
energy consumed in time slot j − 1 of frame τ , and Ekτ,j is
the energy harvested at the beginning of time slot j. From the
evolution of the energy queue, we note that
Bkτ−1 = Q
k
τ−1,T − o
k
τ−1,T (7)
The causality constraint is given by
Bkτ−1+E
k
◦,τ+
ℓ∑
j=1
Ekτ,j≥δ
k
τ E˜τ+
ℓ∑
j=1
okτ,j, ∀ ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }
(8)
which means that the total energy used up to time slot ℓ should
not exceed the total energy harvested from the environment up
to time slot ℓ [2]–[5].
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Fig. 2. Slotted system model. The figure shows one frame. The energy
harvested in time slot j within frame τ is denoted by Ekτ,j , whereas the
energy transmitted in time slot j within frame τ is denoted by okτ,j .
The secrecy throughput of the kth EHS during frame τ is
µkτ =
1
Tf
T∑
j=1
γkτ,jω
k
τ,jR [bits/sec/Hz] (9)
where µ˜kτ =
∑T
j=1 γ
k
τ,jω
k
τ,j is the total number of packets
transmitted during frame τ while µ˜
k
τR
Tf
is the number of
transmitted bits per second per unit frequency. Since the
communication between the kth EHS and its destination is
unsecured if α˜kτ ≤ β˜kτ or when the transmission rate exceeds
CkS , which happens when α˜kτ ≤ 2Rβ˜kτ , the EHS must remain
silent when α˜kτ ≤ 2Rβ˜kτ , i.e., it should not be assigned any
time slots during the current frame; that is, ωkτ = ωkτ,j = 0, ∀j.
The secure sum-throughput maximization problem subject to
energy causality is formulated as follows:
max .
γkτ,j ,ω
k
τ,j∈{0,1}
M∑
k=1
µkτ =
1
Tf
M∑
k=1
T∑
j=1
γkτ,jω
k
τ,jR [bits/sec/Hz]
s.t. Bkτ−1+E
k
◦,τ−δ
k
τ E˜τ+
ℓ∑
j=1
Ekj ≥
ℓ∑
j=1
ωkτ,j(γ
k
τ,jP
k
τ + γ
k
τ,jE
k
p),∀ℓ, k
ωkτ,j=0 if α˜kτ <2Rβ˜kτ , Bkτ−1+Ek◦,τ =0,
or Bkτ−1+E
k
◦,τ−E˜
k
τ <0,∀j, k
(10)
For given assignments, this problem is a convex integer
(binary) program [11] and can be solved efficiently using a
standard convex optimization solver such as Matlab’s CVX.
An alternative formulation starts with a table of M × T
elements in which the columns represent the time slots while
the rows represent the sensors. We assign only one sensor to
each column. i.e., we only have one element with the unity
value and the other elements are zeros. Letting Γkτ,j = 1 if
Sensor k is allocated to and will access time slot j within
frame τ , the optimization problem can be restated as follows
max .
Γkτ,j∈{0,1}
R
Tf
M∑
k=1
T∑
j=1
Γkτ,j [bits/sec/Hz]
s.t.
Bkτ−1+E
k
◦,τ−δ
k
τ E˜τ+
∑ℓ
j=1
Ekj
Pkτ + Ekp
≥
ℓ∑
j=1
Γkτ,j ,∀ℓ, k
M∑
k=1
Γkτ,j ≤ 1, ∀j
Γkτ,j=0 if α˜kτ <2Rβ˜kτ , Bkτ−1+Ek◦,τ =0,
or Bkτ−1+E
k
◦,τ−E˜
k
τ <0,∀j, k
(11)
This problem is a convex integer (binary) program and can be
solved using Matlab’s intlinprog or CVX [12]. The problem is
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Fig. 3. Secrecy average sum-throughput versus R for the considered
schemes.
solved at the destination and the optimal time slot assignments
are sent to the sensors inside the beacon signal.
III. SIMULATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
multiple-access scheme. The simulations are generated using
three sensors, i.e., M = 3, and noise-plus-interference power
levels for the legitimate and eavesdropper links of Nd = 0.1
and Ne = 1 milliWatts (mW), respectively. The random chan-
nel coefficients are modeled as circularly-symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables with zero means and variances σ2α
and σ2β for the legitimate and eavesdropper links, respectively.
We assume, without loss of generality, that σα = 1 and that the
communication between the destination and the sensors lasts
for Tc = 2 seconds. The frame is composed of T = 6 data time
slots where a slot duration is normalized to Ts = 1 seconds.
Thus, the duration of the frame is Tf = Tc + T = 8 seconds.
The energy consumed by the circuits is Ekp = 20 millijoules
(mJ) for Sensor k. For our numerical results, we assume that
the energy arrival rate is Ph = 10 mW/second for all sensors
and therefore Ek1 = Ph×Tc = 20 mJ, Ekj = Ph×Ts = 10 mJ
for all j ≥ 2, and Ek◦,τ = Ph × Ts = Ph. The energy needed
for the communication among nodes and beacon reception is
E˜τ = 0.1 J for all τ . We assume that all energy queues are
initialized at the level Bk0 = 0.11 J for all k. The results are
averaged over F = 1000 random channel realizations.
In Fig. 3, we show the average secrecy sum-throughput for
our proposed scheme in bits/sec/Hz, which is given by the
sum over k and τ of the multiplication of the total number of
transmitted data packets during frame τ , denoted by µ˜kτ , and
R, i.e., µ = 1
TfF
∑F
τ=1
∑M
k=1 µ˜
k
τR bits/sec/Hz. It is clear
that µ˜kτ , which is a function of channel outage, decreases
monotonically with R and hence its summation over k and
τ . Therefore, the throughput in bits/sec/Hz increases at low
R values, reaches a maximum, and then decreases at high R
values. At R = 4 bits/sec/Hz, the throughput gains of our
proposed scheme relative to the fixed power with probabilistic
(adaptive) time slot allocation (FPAS), fixed power with fixed
time slot allocation (FPFS), where each sensor is assigned a
set of time slot permanently, and adaptive power with fixed
time slot allocation (APFS) schemes are 63%, 458%, and
349%, respectively. We assume that σβ = 0.5. For fixed
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Fig. 4. Secrecy average sum-throughput versus σβ for our proposed scheme.
power schemes, the transmit power is 10 mW. For fixed
slot allocation scheme, we assume that Sensors 1, 2, and 3
are always allocated to data slots (1, 2), (3, 4) and (5, 6),
respectively.
In Fig. 4, we plot the average sum-throughput of our pro-
posed scheme versus the standard deviation of the eavesdrop-
per channel σβ . The case of no eavesdropper is represented
by σβ = 0. Fig. 4 demonstrates that the presence of an
eavesdropper and increasing σβ decrease the secrecy sum-
throughput. This is because the eavesdropper’s capability of
decoding the sensors’ data increases with σβ (since the secrecy
capacity decreases and hence the outage probability increases).
Figure 4 is generated assuming R = 3 bits/sec/Hz.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Sudevalayam and P. Kulkarni, “Energy harvesting sensor nodes:
Survey and implications,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials,
vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 443–461, Third 2011.
[2] S. Reddy and C. R. Murthy, “Dual-stage power management algorithms
for energy harvesting sensors,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 11,
no. 4, pp. 1434–1445, 2012.
[3] O. Ozel, K. Tutuncuoglu, J. Yang, S. Ulukus, and A. Yener, “Transmis-
sion with energy harvesting nodes in fading wireless channels: Optimal
policies,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 1732–1743,
2011.
[4] C. K. Ho and R. Zhang, “Optimal energy allocation for wireless
communications powered by energy harvesters,” in Proc. IEEE ISIT,
2010, pp. 2368–2372.
[5] B. Gurakan, O. Ozel, J. Yang, and S. Ulukus, “Energy cooperation in
energy harvesting communications,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61,
no. 12, pp. 4884–4898, December 2013.
[6] J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless
channels,” in IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory,
July 2006, pp. 356–360.
[7] I. Krikidis, J. S. Thompson, and S. McLaughlin, “Relay selection
for secure cooperative networks with jamming,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 8, no. 10, pp. 5003–5011, 2009.
[8] G. Chen, Z. Tian, Y. Gong, Z. Chen, and J. Chambers, “Max-ratio relay
selection in secure buffer-aided cooperative wireless networks,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 719–729, April 2014.
[9] A. Ghasemi and E. Sousa, “Fundamental limits of spectrum-sharing in
fading environments,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 6, no. 2, pp.
649–658, Feb 2007.
[10] K. Hamdi, W. Zhang, and K. Ben Letaief, “Power control in cognitive
radio systems based on spectrum sensing side information,” in Proc.
IEEE ICC, June 2007, pp. 5161–5165.
[11] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex optimization. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[12] M. Grant and S. Boyd, “CVX: Matlab software for disciplined convex
programming, version 2.1,” http://cvxr.com/cvx, Mar. 2014.
